Reading: General Semantics

General Semantics

Understanding Korzybski’s Formulations

Chapter 1 from Mary Lahman's Download Awareness and Action

The changes which general semantics training is designed to bring about are not so much a matter of absorbing an “intellectual subject-matter” as of gaining a new orientation, a system of evaluation, a new way of using language. —Frances Chisholm (1945, p. 1)

ALFRED KORZYBSKI

Alfred Korzybski first published his formulations about “time-binding,” or “what makes humans human” (Kodish & Kodish, 2011, p. 203), in Manhood of Humanity in 1921. According to Korzybski (2000), time-binding was the human capacity to share experiences with others. He hoped that this ability to pass our learning to future generations would allow “each generation [to] begin where the former left off” (Korzybski, p. xxxii). Experiencing firsthand the carnage of World War I, Korzybski often questioned how humans had “progressed so far and so rapidly in fields such as engineering, mathematics, and the sciences, and yet sociologically still were fighting wars and killing each other” (Stockdale, 2009b, p. 35). He was determined to find better ways for humans to communicate.

Korzybski (2000) believed that a scientific orientation toward language—questioning the accuracy of language choices—would help humans to become more effective communicators. He advocated for daily use of the scientific method because of the potential for new discoveries: “The structural revision of [scientists’] language led automatically to new results and new suggestions” (Korzybski, p. 10). Similarly, as a mathematician, he believed that the cardinal and ordinal aspects of numbers provided “an ideal human relational language of structure similar to that of the world and to that of the human nervous system” (Korzybski, p. 259). Consequently, if humans operate from a mathematical orientation, they recognize that as one variable changes in nature, so does the other: “In mathematical notation, a function is expressed: y = f (x), and is read “y equals (f) or function of x” or “y depends on x,” or “the value of y varies as the value of x varies” (Pula, 2000, p. 67). Korzybski (2000) advocated for both a scientific and mathematical orientation toward language, so that human language behaviors accurately reflect the changing nature of the empirical world.

In addition, Korzybski (2000) proposed a map–territory analogy to encourage daily exploration of verbal “maps” (words), noting that these maps do not accurately describe what is happening in the “territory” (empirical world): “A map is not the territory it represents” (p. 58). He used a familiar relationship, maps and territories, so that we would remember when the territory (reality) changes, we need to update the map (language). More recently, Anton (n.d.) proposed that we are better served with the premise, “there is no not territory” (p. 11), because the territory (reality) consists of many maps. He argued,

“Once we recognize how all maps, as part of the territory, are the means by which one part selectively releases and appropriates another part at different levels of abstraction, we no longer need to postulate that ‘reality’ lies somehow ‘behind’ and/or ‘beyond’ our experiences and/or language (Anton, p. 11–12).

In his second book, Science and Sanity, published in 1933, Korzybski (2000) proposed his formulations as a non-Aristotelian system that promoted a “complete and conscious elimination of identification” (p. xcvii). For Korzybski, a “non-Aristotelian” orientation meant illuminating the limitations of Aristotle’s “law of identity,” or the “is of identity” (Pula, 2000, p. 21–22). He argued that even though people, places and things have specific characteristics, which Aristotle labeled as identity, these characteristics are constantly changing and are incomplete representations of the empirical world.

For example, I am a professor, but if that is all you say about me then you are leaving out other important roles in my life—friend, wife, counselor, mother, church member, sister, and many more. This illustration provides evidence of Korzybski’s (2000) second premise of general semantics: “No map represents all of ‘its’ presumed territory” (p. xvii). Recognizing that each one of us plays many roles during a lifetime, we begin to understand how one or two language labels are a static representation of a dynamic reality. Anton (n.d.) updated this premise of Korzybski’s as well, “Any map is only part of the territory” (p.11).

In the introduction to the second edition of Science and Sanity, published in 1941, Korzybski further delineated general semantics as “a new extensional discipline which explains and trains us how to use our nervous systems most efficiently” (p. xxxviii). In other words, if nature is constantly changing—and we know it is when we see flowers bloom from barren ground in the spring—then people’s nervous systems detect, or abstract, only a small percentage of these changes. Korzybski (2000) created a diagram of this abstraction process, called the “structural differential” (p. 471), providing a visual reminder of how we leave out many characteristics when we sense objects and events. We leave out even more details when we use language to explain what we sense.

The structural differential visually demonstrates how we omit numerous characteristics of an event, or reality, and continue to use those inaccurate descriptions to make more inferences. This diagram of the abstraction process depicts Korzybski’s (2000) third premise of general semantics: “Maps are self-reflexive” (p. xvii). In order to account for abstraction levels confusion within, as well as between levels, Anton (n.d.) reworked Korzybski’s third premise: “maps” is the word used to refer to parts of the territory becoming refl exive to other parts at different levels of abstraction (p. 11). For instance, if I state that “I am angry that I got angry,” then I am making an inference about my behavior, confusing levels of abstraction and leaving out important characteristics about what angered me today. Consequently, the ability to make maps of maps (the self-reflexive nature of maps) when the original map is inaccurate, may confuse how we interpret events and mask what we share that with others. Unfortunately, if my reasons for getting angry today include being passed over for a promotion because I am too old, then important conversations about age discrimination may not take place.

In the 1948 preface to the third edition of Science and Sanity, Korzybski stressed the need to apply general semantics formulations, arguing that “when the methods of general semantics are applied, the results are usually beneficial, whether in law, medicine, business, etc. . . . If they are not applied, but merely talked about, no results can be expected” (p. xxxi). Consequently, this text encourages action—applying language behavior correctives rooted in Anton’s (n.d.) new corollaries for general semantics premises:

  1. The map is not the “territory,” so there is no not territory.
  2. A map covers not all the territory, so any map is only part of the territory.
  3. Maps refer to parts of the territory becoming reflexive to other parts at different levels of abstraction.” (p.11)

Let’s see how other scholars, in addition to Anton (n.d.), have contributed to the study of general semantics. I refer to them as general semanticists, even though they represented a number of disciplines and areas of inquiry.

GENERAL SEMANTICISTS

As Korzybski’s general theory of time-binding evolved into formulations, called “general semantics,” other scholars agreed that much could be gained from a scientific inquiry into language behavior. There are recurring themes of systematic inquiry and an efficient use of our nervous system in the following explanations of general semantics:

  • Chisholm (1945) contended that general semantics is the “analysis of language as a human behavior. . . [because] there are many ways in which language, accepted uncritically by the habit of identification, provides us with a map which is unlike in structure to the territory we are talking about” (p. 37).
  • Johnson (1946) praised the methodology for its potential: “It is in its deliberate and systematic concern with the techniques of inquiry that one may most readily find the distinguishing features of general semantics and the degree of promise which it holds for the emancipation of the future from the misfortunes of the past, in our own lives individually and in that cooperative adventure that men call civilization” (p. 20).
  • Hayakawa and Hayakawa (1990) proposed that “methods of modern semantics. . . [allow us] to be concerned with relation between language and reality, between words and what they stand for in the speaker’s and hearer’s thoughts and emotions . . . to approach the study of language as both an intellectual and a moral discipline” (p. x).
  • Postman (1996) called general semantics “the study of relationships between the world of words and the worlds of not-words, the study of the territory we call reality and how, through abstracting and symbolizing, we map the territory” (p. 182).
  • Stockdale (2009a) defined general semantics as “the process of how we perceive, construct, evaluate, and respond to our life experiences” (p. 20).
  • Kodish and Kodish (2011) proposed that general semantics is a “general theory of evaluation. . . [one that is] concerned with understanding how we evaluate, with the nonverbal, inner life of each individual, with how each of us experiences and makes sense of our experiences, including how we use language and how language ‘uses’ us” (p. 23).

Table 1 demonstrates how those who studied Korzybski’s work underscored his basic tenets of general semantics—systematic inquiry, elimination of identification, and efficient use of the nervous system. General semantics, thus, is a “scientific orientation” toward language behavior that encourages an efficient use of the nervous system.

Table 1: General Semantics Defi nitions Systematic Inquiry Elimination of Identification Efficient Use of Nervous System Johnson: systematic concern with techniques of inquiry Chisholm: identification provides a map unlike the territory Stockdale: perceive, construct, evaluate and respond to experiences Kodish & Kodish: general theory of evaluation Hayakawa & Hayakawa: assess relation between words and what they stand for in speaker’s and hearer’s thoughts Kodish & Kodish: how each of us experiences and makes sense of experiences Postman: world of words (explore what we call “reality”) Postman: world of not-words (explore what we call “reality”)

SCIENTIFIC ORIENTATION

Building a scientific attitude toward language behavior is difficult. As Chisholm (1945) noted, “We all know verbal definitions about scientific method, but how many of us are sure that the habitual structure of our reactions, especially to language is mature and scientific?” (p. 2). This lack of maturity is evidenced by how little we question the assumption that the words we choose accurately convey the meanings intended. For example, how many of us delay responding to others’ statements until we investigate how accurately their words represent the person, place, or thing described? We might know that the scientific method involves making observations, generating hypotheses, testing hypotheses, and revising hypotheses, but we rarely hold our language behaviors to such rigorous standards (Stockdale, 2009b).

Johnson (1946) argued that the scientific method is a “method of keeping one’s information, beliefs, and theories up to date” (p. 49–50), but to use the scientific method, we need to be aware of how language infl uences each step of the method. Johnson summarized the impact as follows:

We may say, in the briefest summary that the method of science consists in (a) asking clear answerable questions in order to direct one’s (b) observations, which are made in a calm and unprejudiced manner, and which are then (c) reported as accurately as possible and in such a way as to answer the questions that were asked to begin with, after which (d) any pertinent beliefs or assumptions that were held before the observations were made are revised in light of the observations made and answers obtained. Four main steps are indicated in this brief sketch of the scientific method. Three of them are concerned primarily with the use of language: the asking of the questions that guide the observations, the reporting of the observations so as to answer the questions, and the revising of beliefs or assumptions relevant to the answers obtained. (p. 49–50)

Language shapes the questions that we ask, which then affects what we observe, and, consequently, how we report fi ndings. For example, if I ask students to discuss “peak” learning moments, including what they did and others did to learn the most and to enjoy the experience, they identify behaviors that both students and professors can use during the semester. Contrast those fi ndings with inquiries that ask students, “What changes could improve the teaching or content of this course?” To that question, students identify changes to professors’ behaviors, but professors are only one of the stakeholders involved in the learning experience.

Noting that language shapes the direction of the inquiry, and consequently, the results reported, I often begin my hypotheses, whether teaching or consulting, with questions about what is working well, or as Cooperrider, Whitney, and Stavros (2008) said, “what gives life” (, p. 5). Phrasing questions about what is life-generating comes from my study and use of appreciative inquiry (AI), and provides a good example of how language used at the hypothesis stage of a scientific orientation directs observations and, ultimately, results. Because human beings are uniquely qualifi ed to use the scientific method and learn from inquiries, Korzybski (2000) proposed that people are capable of “time-binding.”

TIME-BINDING

Korzybski (2000) found great hope in the uniquely human ability to use language to learn from others. He proposed that “the human nervous system is a more generalized affair than that of an animal, with more possibilities” (p. 8); hence, humans possess abilities that an animal, such as a dog, does not. As Korzybski (2000) explained:

John Smith, through ignorance of the mechanism [time-binding], may use his nervous system as Fido; but Fido cannot copy Smith. Hence, the danger for Smith, but not for Fido. Fido has many of his own difficulties for his own survival, but, at least, he has no self-imposed conditions, mostly silly and harmful, such as Smith has ignorantly imposed on himself and others. (p. 8)

Korzybski (2000) contended that a scientific orientation to language behavior would delay automatic evaluations from past experiences, resulting in careful exploration of past experiences in order to improve the human condition.

Fido is not trapped by language habits because he cannot access a language fi le labeled “ resentment” when fi nding an empty bowl. Consequently, he eagerly wags his tail when the bowl is fi lled again. Unlike Fido, human beings are capable of using language to remember and share experiences with others, passing information from generation to generation.

To best use these time-binding capacities, Kodish and Kodish (2011) recommended discovering the following: “how to evaluate what we inherit from the past (our own past and the pasts of others and prior generations); how to sort out misinformation and add to our store of useful information; how to most effectively create a positive present and future” (p. 27). Korzybski (2000) contended that a scientific orientation to language behavior would delay automatic evaluations from past experiences, resulting in careful exploration of past experiences in order to improve the human condition.

Stockdale (2009b) proposed that we have the following obligations when we “bind time”:

  1. Time-binding forms the basis for an ethical standard by which to evaluate human behavior. To what degree does the action or behavior promote, or retard timebinding?
  2. Acknowledging our time-binding inheritance dispels us of the “self-made” notion and encourages us to “time-bind” for the benefit of those who follow. (p. 26)

Kodish and Kodish (2011) also proposed a personal time-binding obligation: we need to learn “how to make the most of our individual experiences” (p. 197), which means becoming conscious of individual abstraction. An awareness of abstraction will help us use our nervous systems, and, consequently, our language more efficiently.

SUMMARY

Korzybski (2000) was convinced that a scientific orientation toward language behavior could lead to effective time-binding and, thus, improve the human condition. He called this scientific approach general semantics, a system to eliminate identification, or the “is of identity” proposed by Aristotle. Recognizing the changing nature of reality, Korzybski proposed general semantics formulations to help humans to create maps (language) that accurately represented their territories (empirical world). Moreover, if humans used this systematic approach, they would use their nervous systems and, consequently, their senses efficiently.

These general semantics formulations have been explored by a number of scholars since Korzybski (2000) first introduced this non-Aristotelian system in 1933. Wendell Johnson (1946) explored how language infl uences each step of the scientific process. Hayakawa and Hayakawa (1990) saw the study of language as a moral discipline. Stockdale (2009b) argued that humans have certain time-binding obligations. Kodish and Kodish (2011) encouraged individuals to make the most of personal time-binding opportunities. Responding to challenges to become more ethical communicators, we explore how to be more fully aware of the abstraction process in Chapter 2, by improving both verbal and nonverbal awareness.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

  1. Which definitions of general semantics are most like Korzybski’s? Which one do you like best?
  2. What is the significance of using a “scientific orientation” in your role as a student and as an employee?
  3. In what settings and relationships do we need to remember “the map is not the territory” analogy the most?

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