Extensional Orientation

The final GS formulation to cover in this course is one we've mentioned and referenced several times during the past five weeks. However, we haven't really defined or explained it. Perhaps that's because, without the previous readings and discussions and videos, a description of extensional orientation may not have made much sense.

But since an extensional orientation can be considered as the practical objective of General Semantics in action and practice, let's briefly explain the differences between extensional and intensional.

Intensional and Extensional

The first thing to understand is that you will not find these terms in a dictionary. Alfred Korzybski used these two words, spelled with an 's' in the middle instead of a 't', to denote a continuum of attitude, behavior, or orientation.

Intensional orientations are based on verbal definitions, associations, etc., largely disregarding observations as if they would involve a "principle" of "talk first and never mind the life facts."

Extensional orientations are based on ordering observations, investigations, etc., first and the verbalization next in importance. — Alfred Korzybski

Similar to the table we used to illustrate the differences regarding Consciousness (or Awareness) of Abstracting-Evaluating, we can consider intensional and extensional orientations as exhibiting the following characteristics in terms of degrees on a continuum.

Relies primarily on verbal definitions.	Gives primacy to observed or reported facts.
Uncritically accepts validity of labels, categories, classifications, properties. Prone to 'animalistic' evaluations (hardening of the *categories and dog*matism); allness.	Focuses on individuals or specific items, challenges appropriateness of group labels. Recognizes differences among similarities, similarities among differences; non-allness.
Exhibits signal reactions: immediate, reflexive, conditioned, "hot button" responses.	Exhibits symbol reactions: delayed, considered, attentive responses.
Lacks consciousness or awareness of abstracting; confuses or reverses the order of abstracting. (Identification)	Conscious or aware of abstracting (non-identity). Uses the extensional devices of indexing and dating.
Prone to either/or, two-valued evaluations.	Recognizes multi-valued potential for evaluations.
Prone to confuse inferences as facts.	Recognizes inferences as inferences, sets a high standard for 'facts.'
Prone to elementalistic evaluating, presuming that different words mean that their different referents exist in isolation, separation.	Recognizes the non-elementalistic nature of items or events that may be separated verbally but cannot be separated in the non-verbal 'reality'; uses extensional device of the hyphen.
Uses absolutistic, unconditional, and all-presuming language that presents false-to-fact assurance and certainty.	Uses conditional language that reflects humble awareness of the tentative, uncertain, and limited nature of human knowledge; uses the extensional device of etc.

In Drive Yourself Sane: Using the Uncommon Sense of General-Semantics, Susan and Bruce Kodish explain:

When we orient ourselves by verbal definitions, when we prefer preserving our maps (even maps without territories) to checking them out against 'facts,' when we fail to become aware of our assumptions and inferences and to test them out when possible, when we identify different levels of abstracting, we behave intensionally.

When we orient ourselves towards 'facts,' when we check our maps against possible territories, when we clarify and test our inferences and assumptions, when we don't identify different orders of abstracting, we behave extensionally.

Intensional and extensional orientations also exist on a continuum. We know of no one who exhibits a purely extensional orientation. Unfortunately, abundant examples of people near the other end of the continuum exist. Some of them are confined to institutions. Some of them speak, write books, appear on radio and television and run institutions. Most of us appear somewhere in between. (p. 126)